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The War of Unengaged Forces - Superpowers at Sea in an Era of Competitive Coexistence

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The nation benefits from the existence of the Navy, even in absence of war, but a fuller, more coherent, realization of those benefits is possible if they are included in the considerations and deliberations leading to the structuring and operation of the Navy.

THE WAR OF UNENGAGED FORCES—

SUPERPOWERS AT SEA

IN AN ERA OF COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE

by

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Introduction. In this age, the terms "war" and "peace" do not suffice to describe the complex realities with which the statesman and the soldier must grapple. "Unengaged force warfare" is a concept that transcends this difficulty and allows us to examine the critical challenges that face our nation today. The most active frontier in unengaged force warfare at present is at sea, and it is here that the eventual outcome of unengaged force warfare may well be decided.

As a great power, the United States has a choice for the future. Our Navy can be required to keep planning and operating as it has, under the assumption that this planning and operating is both efficient and sufficient, or that assumption can be questioned. Is the Navy really efficient? Or can it better maintain the peace while retaining constant or improved wartime readiness? And do our present capabilities for war match the tasks of war? No matter how efficient the capabilities are for certain missions, if the Navy lacks overall combat readiness, the economy is false. Numerous studies dwell on certain wartime deficiencies,[1] and the most acute receive the most attention—as they should. But there are other, less direct, threats that should also be considered.

The Soviet strategy in unengaged force warfare postpones the decisive battle and chooses to confront the West with a series of small-risk maneuvers—a policy of encroachment that risks minor setbacks for the small gains that can eventually accumulate to satisfy long-term goals.[2] Soviet maneuvers in search of such "small risk" opportunities have today led the Soviets to sea, and confront the West with a worldwide challenge that is both diffuse and difficult to fully identify. At least part of this challenge is the indirect attack on U.S. influence. U.S. strategy does not set a

high priority on countering expansion of Soviet influence that erodes the relative U.S. position of influence in the world. While no shots have been exchanged, new perceptions of the implications of Soviet naval capabilities have replaced old perceptions of unchallenged U.S. naval superiority at sea in war or peace.

By far the most disturbing aspect of this situation has been the failure of the United States to view this as a serious problem. This vulnerability can be defended by forces properly structured and maintained—this task should be included among our other critical warfare tasks to ensure that the forces needed for this task are viewed as central, and not peripheral, to the needs of the nation. For the United States, engaged force warfare is the *raison d'etre* for naval forces, but we should not let ourselves become so mesmerized by certain sea control and power projection missions that we fail to provide either for required combat readiness or for protracted peacetime competition.

That this is necessary, now more than ever before, results from both a contracting Navy and an expanding threat. Many of the tasks that we could confidently carry out on an ad hoc basis with a more robust and rendundant force, we must now either plan for explicitly or abandon. While our basic mission has not changed, our capability to undertake derivative tasks is becoming increasingly circumscribed. "Naval presence" is an example of one such derivative task. Although the U.S. 6th and 7th Fleets have taken on an important presence mission, this is being done possibly at the expense of their military missions. In "The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare" the two missions are seen to be related.

Successful combat capability is essential and it must be insured before all else. But a capability cannot be substituted for a strategy. The former says only that if we get into a shooting war we will win. The latter must consider the broader problems of using those capabilities to achieve U.S. objectives without recourse to war—or, if war comes, bringing it to a conclusion that is acceptable to the United States at the lowest possible level of violence. A constraint, increasingly binding, is that these things be done as economically as possible.

The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare addresses these broader problems. To a combat foundation we add concepts of presence, credible threat, perception, and influence. This leads to "The Efficient Program," in which it is suggested that naval capabilities might be restructured or created to better produce the benefits we seek.

Several examples are given of programs, deployments, and forces that do (or could) contribute to the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy in war and peace. In addition to sharpening our focus on the tasks of war, establishment of a legitimate peacetime task for the U.S. Navy is recommended. A comprehensive, coherent political-military strategy is called for. Regional analyses of naval warfare tasks in pursuance of explicit political and military objectives is seen as the key to an adequate and efficient Navy.

Framework for Peacetime—the Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare. The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare is supported by five axioms; the first defines its benefits.

Axiom 1. Benefit in unengaged force warfare is the achievement of a political objective.

Political objectives are formulated in various ways, and can often be achieved by other than naval means. A list appropriate, but not unique, to naval means in peacetime might include:[3]

- Supporting friends and clients;
- Coercing enemies;

- Neutralizing similar activities by others;
- Advertising one's seapower;
- Training and improving Allied navies;
- Encouraging other navies to take a burden off U.S. Navy; and
- Exerting a more diffuse influence in politically ambiguous situations in which even one's own objectives may be uncertain.

When naval means are employed as a political tool or element of foreign policy, the concept of presence must always be considered. Naval presence is not a simple concept; its meaning has been compromised by overuse and underprecision until today it means essentially anything one wants it to.

Adm. James L. Holloway III, when Chief of Naval Operations, provided a definition of naval presence when he pointed out the key elements that would make such presence effective:

> The effectiveness of naval presence cannot be considered separately from war-fighting capability. In order to encourage friends, deter enemies, or influence neutrals, forces deployed to crisis areas must possess a war-fighting capability .... To be effective in the presence role, naval forces must reflect a readily perceived capability for carrying out the implied threats.[4]

It is illuminating to examine the operative elements of Admiral Holloway's definition for in addition to combat capabilities, essential to wartime roles as well as peacetime presence, he cites two additional attributes unique to the peacetime mission:

- Threat must be credible;
- Capabilities must be perceived.

These attributes are the bases for the next two axioms of unengaged force warfare.

Axiom 2. Credible threat, in unengaged force warfare, requires conventional offensive military capabilities.

If the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States is not already an incredible proposition, it is rapidly becoming that. When the United States can no longer credibly threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to achieve political objectives then we confront the reality that any use of nuclear weapons will occur only after actual war begins, and then only if the Soviet Union chooses to provoke that use. In this context, nuclear weapons are not relevant to the "small risk" challenges of the Soviet Union in unengaged force warfare.

What conventional capabilities are relevant to unengaged force warfare? This question is answered by:

Axiom 3. Perceived capabilities are the only relevant capabilities in unengaged force warfare.

Combat capabilities are clearly necessary in war; but as long as engaged conflict is avoided, the battle is fought in the arena of world perceptions and the outcome is constructed by men in terms of the predicted outcome of putative battle. In this battle of perceived capabilities, observe Hoeber and Schneider, "... an imbalance can increase the danger of a Hobson's choice for the United States between hostilities and concessions under diplomatic coercion by the Soviet Union."[5] Actual combat capabilities are related to perceptions, and are frequently the very substance of those perceptions. Yet it is the perception itself, and not the capability, that counts in unengaged force warfare.

As navies come to rely more and more on "black box" technology and other less-visible elements of war, there is a growing possibility of gross divergence between perceived

capabilities, which contribute to power in the absence of actual combat, and actual combat effectiveness. Specifically, can the U.S. Navy defeat in this battle a 6,000-ton Russian ship (described as a cruiser), bristling with radars and electronic equipment, and crammed with multiple guns, surface-to-surface missiles, antiaircraft missiles, and antisubmarine rocket launchers, with an 8,000-ton destroyer, clean of line, deploying one gun, a missile launcher, and a helicopter?[6]

And what of the Soviet *Kiev*-class carrier? Though judged inferior to U.S. aircraft carriers in traditional combat roles,[7] *Kiev* is highly successful politically; it adds strength to perceptions of a growing "blue-water" Soviet Navy.[8] In marked contrast to the carrier building program of the United States, more *Kievs* are under construction, and a follow-on class is likely. In coming years, as *Kiev* and her sisters become increasingly numerous on the world's oceans, and U.S. forces increasingly scarce, the Soviet Navy will emerge the de facto winner in yet another battle of the War of Unengaged Forces. It matters little what the wartime purposes of these ships may be.

"In time of peace," observes naval strategist James Cable, "a superior warship on the spot can achieve results not obtainable in other ways and without regard to the purpose for which the ship was built. What counts is the existence of the Soviet Navy, not the original motives of its builders."[9] This does not suggest designing ships to frighten rather than to fight: few things would be more ludicrous than a seagoing equivalent of the Potemkin village. There will always arise those occasional extreme situations in which force must actually be applied or resisted to achieve specific objectives. If the Potemkin fleet has not been exposed until this point, it surely will be exposed in such a situation.

The incalculable political losses to a nation thus exposed would far exceed any dollars that could possibly be saved through the "facade" strategy. For the United States an "adequate" level of perceived capabilities has generally meant enough to maintain a stable international framework within which orderly change and growth can occur. Actions that threaten the stability of the system must be discouraged (or penalized). The loss of perceived capabilities would lessen the ability of the United States to maintain such a system and would ultimately limit the nation's access to system benefits.

In extreme situations, in which perceptions are tested, engaged conflict can be viewed as a mechanism for adjusting perceptions to capabilities. If the outcome is favorable, improved perceptions will allow policy to become more assertive—or less acquiescent. Conversely, if the outcome is unfavorable perceptions of capabilities will be reduced, and policy will be more constrained. Mechanisms other than engaged bilateral conflict can also shape perceptions.

Limited wars and a variety of regional conflicts have allowed nations, including the Soviet Union and the United States, to project some perceptions of combat capability far beyond the battlefield. But how is this done for capabilities that are not demonstrated in battle? Harder yet, how is this done when there is no battle? The Soviet Union seems to have considered this problem and deals with it in a variety of ways, one of which is propaganda.

The Soviet Union supports an enormous propaganda program that has as one objective manipulation of the perceptions of target nations or groups to bring about desired action (or inaction). The catechism recited—sometimes implicitly—by the Soviet leadership is that, through an inevitable and irreversible world process—the continuing change in the "correlation of forces" in Russia's favor[10]—the United States must fall militarily behind the Soviet Union. This repetitious Soviet chant has strong

effects on Western perceptions: concessions made to the Soviet Union in SALT, for example, are sometimes explained by the argument, "... if it were not for this Agreement the Soviets would increase their margin of superiority to some even larger extent."[11]

The naval refrain in this chant has become Gorshkov's oft-quoted dictum, "Sooner or later they [Americans] will have to understand that they have no mastery whatsoever of the seas. The flag of the Soviet Navy today flies proudly over the oceans."[12] This quote appears often in Western publications. It is featured in the U.S. Navy's official and widely circulated primer, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*[13]--but far from becoming a rallying point for effective U.S. response as was undoubtedly intended, the claim seems to have met with some feeling of inevitability in the West.

Soviet media have persistently compared favorably the strength of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, the 5th Escadra,[14] with that of the U.S. 6th Fleet; and the strength of the Soviet Navy to the strength of the U.S. Navy. In contrast, the United States has no coherent peacetime naval philosophy or objective. If there is a persistent theme, it is the message of decline in American naval power transmitted by the American media and official Navy statements. Edward Luttwak assesses the effects of these processes:

> Whatever the imperatives of self-denigration imposed by the Congressional appropriation process, it is obvious that this official stance of the U.S. Navy must intrude on third-party perceptions of the (naval) balance of power. In the absence of full, or in many cases, any, technical knowledge, third-party political leaders will be influenced, as will public opinion, by what the media tell them.
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> ... The more sophisticated observers will discount the latter to some extent, mindful of the particular political circumstances that prevail in the United States, but even so, the message of American naval decline will nevertheless intrude on their perceptions ... America's friends and clients are discouraged and intimidated by the presumed adverse trend in the balance of naval power; her enemies, on the other hand, are encouraged to believe that they may harm American interests with impunity.[15]

These problems are often ignored by the United States with a certain ethnocentrism. When the problems are not ignored, proposed solutions often appear to be inconsistent with the overarching U.S. principles of free speech and fair play, and the solutions are not accepted. The basic problem remains:

How can the United States, while maintaining war capabilities, most efficiently and effectively improve world perceptions of those capabilities during times of peace?

In discussing perceptions, Luttwak referred to effects on America's friends and clients as well as her enemies. This suggests an important distinction between engaged force warfare, in which the only target is the enemy, and unengaged force warfare. This distinction is made explicit in:

Axiom 4. The targets of unengaged force warfare are:

- Your friends and neutrals;
- Your enemies;
- Yourselves.

What means does the United States have of influencing the perceptions of these groups?[16]

Influencing Friends and Neutrals. U.S. naval activities frequently affect the perceptions of friends and neutrals. Such activities include:[17]

- Joint and combined operations and training;

- Deployments, operations, and exercises that give media, naval professionals, and invited dignitaries an opportunity to witness U.S. capabilities firsthand;
- Mine clearing;
- Carrier air shows,
- Marine amphibious demonstrations.

These and similar activities can be readily carried out in a way to enhance perceptions of U.S. combat capability. None of these activities has an explicit "perceptions" objective, but all do support or could be modified to support such an objective. At the same time, care must be taken to avoid damaging perceptions of U.S. naval capabilities unnecessarily.

Influencing Enemies. Many of the previous activities that influence friends and neutrals would affect adversary perceptions of U.S. naval power and capabilities. Charles Peterson illustrates how the Soviet Union has exploited one such activity, the fleet exercise, in a way seemingly designed to influence the perceptions of others;

> The fleet exercise, like the port visit, is a time-honored instrument of policy; but the Soviets have given it new dimensions. Nothing quite like *Okean* in 1970 or *Okean*-75 five years later had ever been witnessed before; and if statements by Western military leaders are any indication, both exercises have had important effects on Western perceptions of Soviet naval power. As a demonstration of a great power's global reach, the word-wide, coordinated naval "maneuver" is a Soviet innovation, the successor to the round-the-world cruise of Theodore Roosevelt's day.
>
> Because it more closely resembles what the Soviet Union's adversaries might actually be faced with in a shooting war, it also has a greater effect on their naval planning. On a smaller scale, simulated missile strikes on nearby U.S. carrier forces in periods of international calm have, by dint of their effect on these targets, widened the vocabulary of action language available to the U.S.S.R. for signalling during crises.[18]

Influencing Ourselves. The effect of perceptions on ourselves, and the influence these perceptions have on how we design, build, and even operate our Navy, have far-reaching consequences. Luttwak referred to this when he expressed concern that seepage of public relations attitudes into the thought and disposition of the U.S. Navy might have damaging consequences; and he prophetically suggested that this might give rise to a defensive orientation inconsistent with the vital role of the Navy. "In the latter context," he observed, "strategic nuclear forces and land-based deployments are indeed defensive and reactive, and only the U.S. Navy can provide an offensive element in what would otherwise be an unblanced defense-only posture."[19]

The professional training and operational experiences of Navy officers over the courses of their careers are probably the greatest determinants shaping their perceptions of U.S. naval capabilities. Such programs as the Atlantic Tactical Command Readiness Program[20] provide training in strategy, operations, tactics, and capabilities. Various other programs,[21] exercises, and operations emphasize tactical training in realistic threat environments, and contribute to our own perceptions of our capabilities. Such training produces not only the readiness benefits by which such programs are justified, but perceptions benefits that are largely intangible.

These activities—affecting friends and neutrals, enemies, and ourselves—all

contribute to how U.S. naval capabilities are perceived in the world. Perceptions are important in unengaged force warfare, and up to a point, with constant capabilities, greater influence can be achieved by improving perceptions. The final problem of peace in The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare is returning to a condition of peace, from a prior condition of war.

War Termination. Unengaged force warfare is interrupted by violent conflict, but always resumes after the battles end. After the initial battles, a great deal more is known about the enemy's strength than before the war. As fighting continues, its purposes change—as do the forces required to achieve those purposes. After the final battle, it is the threat of what is to come, more than the damage already done, that determines the combatants' powers of coercion over one another.

While damage already done does determine how much additional damage an enemy might be willing to endure, it is the surviving capability of the attacker to inflict that additional damage that is relevant. Restating an earlier axiom slightly, we obtain:

Axiom 5. Surviving capabilities are the only capabilities relevant at war's end.

How perceptions of U.S. naval capabilities might be improved to contribute to U.S. power and prevention of war have been discussed. Providing for the required residual capabilities at war's end requires another approach. We can begin by identifying those capabilities and resources that, after engaged force warfare ends, will contribute the most to war termination negotiations. This approach is unconventional in that we are beginning with a desired ending, and working backwards toward an optimum beginning. The effort should give additional important insights on what our prehostility force requirements really are and what the strategy for using these forces should be to ensure that the desired posthostility forces survive.

A strategy of preserving with certainty a portion of our power projection force might be recommended, realizing that after a great war, land-based air forces would be scarce or nonexistent. Sea-based air forces might have far greater influence over events through being preserved for purposes of coercion during war termination negotiations, than they would have had through use and expenditure earlier in the war.

Provisions to retain a postwar sea control capability might also be considered; particularly when noting the buildup in forward-deployed, highly mobile, offensive weapons poised against NATO in ratios far more overpowering than faced by the Allies in the days preceding Dunkirk.

Evidence exists[22] that the Soviet Union has both the forces and capabilities necessary for implementation of a limited naval withholding strategy in the event of war with the United States. The point cannot be made strongly enough that in the absence of adequate U.S. residual capabilities, *Kiev* and the remainder of the Soviet general-purpose Navy could exercise sea denial and exert psychological pressure possibly decisive and certainly deleterious to U.S. interests in war-termination negotiations.

If plans and programs can be modified to be more supportive of the political role that naval forces play in peacetime, and if naval forces can be designed or deployed to be even more usable as instruments of political influence, then how should these be done? The answer is given in two parts: the first part discusses the present program, the second part discusses ways we might modify the present program to achieve a more efficient program.

The Present Program. Present force planning is based on two concepts: deterrence and combat.[23] Naval

mobility and ability to project conventional power on land is not now being exploited in our overall deterrence strategy. Our combat capability is being more and more fitted to the requirements of a single NATO war scenario. A third concept, influence, eludes definition and escapes attention. Influence is slippery. The fundamental difficulty is that influence is a nonobservable—we see and measure only claims to influence.

A second difficulty is that techniques of influence are very much dependent on whom we are trying to influence. What might impress a Third World country may not impress the Soviet Union. The potential military capability represented by a hidden missile-equipped submarine might influence the leadership of a totalitarian society in important ways but have no influence on the less-elite elements of an emerging African nation.

In time of peace, influence tends to dominate international political behavior; but we do not know enough about the linkage between military capability and influence. Even without physical contact, influence can be as potent as cannon shot.

For the United States, influence is not a factor we consider in justifying naval force levels—naval forces are calibrated to limited views of deterrence and combat. It would be rather remarkable if a Navy structured mainly for nuclear deterrence and NATO war is the best Navy for all seasons. The best the United States can hope to do now is to have forces that, in the aggregate, will influence the right people, in the right way.

When dealing with peacetime uses of naval power, studies usually begin by analyzing previous peacetime uses of naval power. Unfortunately, such studies are limited to considering only those cases in which that power has been used in some observable way, and cannot consider cases where the existence of that power alone made unnecessary its use. The problem of peacetime use of naval power, with its ambiguities, its subleties and nuances, and its subjective measures, is a "soft" problem and for the most part analytically intractable. Engaged force warfare, in even its most violent moments, is the more certain problem to deal with analytically.[24] We avoid the soft problems of unengaged force warfare altogether by assuming that violent conflict is a "worst case," and arguing that planning to fight worst cases will be more than adequate for all other cases. This critical assumption has already failed and the final judgment of history may be that planning adequate for fighting war was inadequate for preventing or terminating war, or for protecting worldwide U.S. interests in peacetime.

Studies of the peacetime uses of naval power are frustrated not only by an inability to look below some arbitrary, observable threshold, but also by the fact that the uses that are observed are not true images—they are only reflections of pragmatic applications of that power. Forces used in reaction are ad hoc; they almost always will have been designed for a specific wartime mission, with crews and staffs trained for that mission. This design and training process aids in achieving maximum combat efficiency in war but it can serve us poorly in other situations.

In crises during peacetime, decisionmakers will generally be required to use these forces in ways dictated by their wartime design. Under increasing stress, decisionmakers will focus on immediate rather than long-term consequences, and will have a tendency to apply learned wartime routines and standard procedures that may be inappropriate to new circumstances.

It is not surprising to find historical studies of the peacetime uses of naval forces revealing little of the full range of uses actually available. The question of

using (much less building and operating) naval forces in a nonreactive mode, in new ways not related to combat, really never comes up. Peacetime's unique needs, as well as those in common with war, should be considered; and those combined needs should be reflected in the way we build and operate our Navy.[25]

The attack carrier specifically, and the Navy in general, have utility not only in actual battle, but they have utility at every level of competition and conflict in unengaged force warfare as well. We often forget that the greatest contribution of carriers and Marines in this postwar period has, like NATO, been that of preventing the crises and catastrophes that did not happen. To praise the value of these forces in terms related to crises that do occur, like calculating the numbers of these forces "required" on the basis of crises that could occur, overlooks this central point.

Aircraft carriers, the multifaceted centerpieces of our general-purpose naval forces, with their awesome seapower capabilities, are becoming increasingly difficult to justify on the basis of what they do in war: memories of past wars are becoming less vivid, and views of future wars are uncertain or ambiguous. Analyses that limit examination of the uses of naval forces to the most threatening or analytically tractable cases, or exclude contributions outside of certain artificially constructed categories, fail to discover the full range of contributions made by naval forces in unengaged force warfare.

Assigning small or negligible values to the contributions made by naval forces in unengaged force warfare makes it difficult or impossible to justify the existence of forces for such purposes, and also reduces the incentive for using any other forces for these purposes. This places the United States at a disadvantage in competition with a Soviet adversary whose values are different from ours, particularly if the relevant values of those whom we wish to influence are similar to those Soviet values.

The Efficient Program. The efficient program must provide naval capabilities calibrated to warfare tasks; and the tasks must be consistent with overall U.S. political objectives. The Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare presented a number of peacetime political objectives—supporting friends and clients, coercing enemies, advertising one's seapower, and others. There are also wartime objectives:

- Rapidly and effectively responding to crises;
- Maintaining clear force superiority at the point(s) of crisis, in the face of a Soviet buildup;
- Minimizing vulnerabilities at other points that might be threatened by Soviet military force.

Without a comprehensive political-military strategy it is almost impossible to articulate how these various objectives of peace and war should be weighted or ordered. But even without such a strategy, the concepts of unengaged force warfare can help us to achieve some peacetime objectives by the way we structure or operate some of our combat forces.

We might want to ensure, first, as we meet the various objectives of war, that adequate perceptions of these capabilities also exist. There are many ways to do this. Worldwide exercises offer one means of demonstrating many of these capabilities on a global scale. Smaller exercises might demonstrate how we act to minimize certain naval vulnerabilities. In 6th Fleet exercises, for example, U.S. aircraft carriers might be routinely withdrawn from the Eastern Mediterranean, and augmented for a later return. This would condition nations including the Soviet Union to view such initial actions as possibly signaling a higher level of resolve and readiness in crises, and

would avoid giving a false impression of abandonment.

There is another, more vital, thing that we should do to minimize vulnerability. To minimize vulnerability the United States must be able to capitalize fully on advanced technology. And we must be able to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. For the Navy, for example, to reduce the threat to U.S. carriers—thereby enhancing the survivability and credibility of the West's conventional deterrent capability—both the Aegis system and cruise missile system developments could be accelerated. Cruise missiles, armed with conventional warheads, could be widely deployed and instantly available to reduce two key threats to U.S. carriers.[26]

- Soviet Backfire bombers, while on the ground; and their runways.
- Soviet submarines, while in port; and their bases.

This last point offsets a "surge" advantage the Soviets are often assumed to possess owing to their practice of keeping a relatively large percentage of their naval forces in port.

Ship numbers and types, operating patterns, and command flexibility should be designed with both NATO and non-NATO contingencies in mind. In the event of NATO war in central Europe, the Navy's contribution is seen more and more as one of sea control in the North Atlantic—and current capabilities are beginning to reflect this thinking. A more efficient strategy might require improving U.S. naval capabilities to threaten worldwide Soviet military vulnerabilities as a deterrent to war; and in the event of war, attacking these vulnerabilities to bring about war termination more quickly.

In vital areas outside NATO, where our policies are sometimes tentative and indecisive, we may have an equal if not greater need for a strong, flexible Navy. It may also be an area in which perceptions play the greatest role; yet it is in just such areas where we find our capabilities stretched most thinly, and our reserves most marginal. A comprehensive political-military strategy would identify such areas, and would be a necessary first step towards establishing the required U.S. presence. Reasonably frequent naval deployments, with excursions designed specifically to highlight that presence, should be an early result of such a strategy. The deployments should be publicized, and the strength of the naval forces should be respectable. Aircraft carriers and our most modern surface combatants should be sent.[27]

A comprehensive political-military strategy would help to ensure that U.S. policies and naval capabilities are complementary at all points where the interests of the United States and the interests of the Soviet Union clash. A region-by-region analysis, at each point of intersection, would then be possible in which we could examine our combat readiness in each warfare task relevant to that region. Where deficiencies are discovered policies might be changed, or capabilities improved, to prevent later losses. Regions that should be examined today include:

- NATO's Flanks—northern, Baltic, Mediterranean;
- Western Pacific/Northeast Asia;
- Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf;
- South Atlantic.

With continuously changing political conditions in which technological advances continually alter military capabilities equations, no fixed formulas are possible. We must handle the present threat, and provide for future security efficiently. Striving for an efficient program is a task that has to be tackled afresh every day and each day's challenge requires new maneuvers.

Conclusion. The distinctions made in discussing activities and forces needed to prevent war, to fight war, and to end war, are artificial in one sense: for planning purposes war/nonwar is a

continuum. As we plan for deterrence, we must also plan for failure of deterrence; and as we plan for war we must plan for termination of war. The activities and forces that exist for one need affect the calculations for other needs. For example, the same capabilities that influence allies prior to war also work to retain those allies during war and later.

In a practical sense, though, these distinctions are very real for the U.S. Navy is becoming more task-specific, and more objective-oriented. We have the choice of adding to the tasks of nuclear deterrence and sea control the tasks of unengaged force warfare, and letting these combined tasks generate Navy resource requirements; or we can attempt to do all things on a budget based on nuclear deterrence and sea control alone.

We need to look at both peace before war and peace after war and ensure that vital U.S. objectives in each are identified and provided for. Widening our mission to include these peacetime objectives will require developing some new means of accomplishment. This might require increases in some forces, and different designs or deployments for others. Our strategic nuclear forces, for example, were built more for political/deterrent purposes than combat ones and we only now may be paying the price. New or modified procedures for recommending, gaining approval for and implementing programs with political objectives will have to be developed.

The objective is to win the war of unengaged forces. Comprehensive political-military planning for this objective will produce greater benefits during times of peace, and will retain undiminished the essential capabilities for victory in the event of war.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of the United States Naval Academy, Commander Madison holds an M.S. in Operations Research from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and is currently completing M.A. studies in National Security at Georgetown University. He is assigned to the Operations Study Group at the Center for Naval Analyses, Washington, D.C. His operational specialty is surface warfare.

NOTES

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6. Edward N. Luttwak, Studies in International Affairs Number 23, *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 43.

7. James W, Kehoe, et al., "U.S. Observations of the *Kiev*," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1977, pp. 105-111; Ulrich Schulz-Torge, "The *Kiev*: A German View," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1977, pp. 111-115; and William R. Hynes, "The Role of the *Kiev* in Soviet Naval Operations," *To Use the Sea—Readings in Seapower and Maritime Affairs* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 324-328.

8. Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," *Soviet Oceans Development*, Committee Print, 94th Congress (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1976), p. 90; Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 180, expands on a concept introduced by MccGwire in discussing "surplus," and the flexibility that this quantity gives the Soviet Navy with *Kiev*.

9. James Cable, *The Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East: Her Capabilities and Intentions* (England: Southampton University and the Royal United Service Institution at Milford-on Sea, 1970), as quoted in Norman Polmar, *Gorshkov: A Modern Naval Strategist* (Falls Church, Va.: Lulejian and Associates, 1974), p. 127.

10. MccGwire, p. 99.

11. Donald G. Brennan, "When the Salt Hit the Fan," *National Review*, 23 June 1972, p. 6-F. These concessions may have been based more on Henry Kissinger's assessment of U.S. public opinion in an era of post-Vietnam retrenchment; nonetheless there was a consensus that Soviet might was increasing, and a hope that SALT would slow the process.

12. Sergei G. Gorshkov, speaking aboard the cruiser *Kirov* at Navy Day celebrations, Leningrad, 30 July 1967; quoted in Donald W. Mitchell, *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 517. Other translations of this quote have become more popular, see note 13.

13. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, 3rd ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1978), p. 3: "The flag of the Soviet Navy flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the United States will have to understand it no longer has mastery of the seas." This version, with slightly different emphasis, first appeared in Lawrence W. Martin, "Strategy of the Southern Oceans," *World Survey*, No. 11 (London: Atlantic Education Trust, November 1969), p. 3, where it was attributed to Gorshkov on some unspecified occasion "last year."

14. In the Soviet Navy an escadra is one notch below a fleet in rank. For analysis of the Soviet 5th Escadra see Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, March 1976); Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Countering the Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, July 1977, pp. 25-32.

15. Luttwak, p. 45.

16. Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., Professional Paper No. 190, *European Perceptions and East-West Competition* (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1977), provides an analytical framework for systematic assessment of perceptions of various elements in the system of East-West competition.

17. Representative programs listed. Others, and discussions, in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *The Use of Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings Institution, December 1976), chap. II; Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (New York: New York Times Book, 1976), pp. 128, 466-467, 468 and 141; Charles C. Peterson, "Showing the Flag"; Dismukes, et al., chap. 3.

18. Peterson section titled "Exercises as Demonstrations," in Michael MccGwire, et al., eds., *Soviet Naval Influence—Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, 1977), provide numerous examples and case studies of Soviet naval forces being used to support foreign policy objectives.

19. Luttwak, pp. 45-46f.

20. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., "CINCLANTFLT on Tactics," *Surface Warfare*, September 1977, pp. 10-13.

21. Individual training, team and ship training, at sea training, staff training, and other program elements discussed in "Tacticians—Seaman to Admiral," *Surface Warfare*, September 1977, pp. 2-7.

22. Hamlin A. Caldwell, Jr., "The Ocean Bastion Theory of Soviet Naval Operations," unpublished paper, Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1975; Bradford Dismukes, "Roles and Missions of Soviet Naval General Purpose Forces in Wartime: Pro-SSBN Operations?" Professional Paper 130 (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1974); and John J. Herzog, "Perspectives on Soviet Naval Development: A Navy to Match

National Purposes," in Paul J. Murphy, ed., *Naval Power in Soviet Strategy—Studies in Communist Affairs*, v. 2 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), pp. 37-55.

23. According to law, "The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea," U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., *U.S. Code, Title 10—Armed Forces*, 1970 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971), v. 2, p. 1649.

24. One of the most important underpinnings of any study is the measure of effectiveness (M.O.E.) chosen by the analyst. The M.O.E. is the common denominator used to measure and compare the various outcomes of a study, as inputs or variables are changed; and it is used to compare the results of one study with other studies, experiments, and exercises. These comparisons become the basis for decision. Without a measurable, quantifiable M.O.E. which can measure to what degree the (real) objective is achieved even the most careful analysis is unlikely to be very influential in the decisionmaking process.

Peacetime studies have thus far failed to discover a truly satisfactory M.O.E. and due to the nature of the problem it is unlikely that they ever will. Wartime studies, on the other hand, have a panoply to choose from: "numbers of ships sunk," "exchange ratio," and "weapons effectiveness," are three from a study I am currently involved in—there are many, many others. *Naval Operations Analysis* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), defines M.O.E.s; *Means of Measuring Naval Power with Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974) lists several M.O.E.s appropriate to naval forces.

25. Edward Wegener, "Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nuclear Age," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1972, pp. 190-207, offers a model for a theory of maritime power in nonwar. Other articles discussing the "new" maritime environment include Geoffrey Kemp and Harlan Ullman, "Towards a New Order of U.S. Maritime Policy," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, pp. 98-114; Worth H. Bagley, "Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade," Adelphi papers, no. 139, 1977, pp. 1-49, particularly "A Programme for the Future," pp. 35-39; and John M. Lee, "United States Military Roles in a Period of Resource Scarcity," in B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., *War, Strategy and Maritime Power* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977), pp. 325-350.

26. The DOD is evaluating the use of cruise missiles in conventional warfare; the feasibility was demonstrated recently, when a reconfigured Tomahawk cruise missile laid down an accurate pattern of submunitions on a runway target. Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "New Applications Eyed for U.S. Cruise Missiles," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 26 June 1978, pp. 17-18.

27. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., "Soviet Strategy and U.S. Counter-Strategy," in Bruce Palmer, Jr., ed., *Grand Strategy for the 1980s* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 51.